

He was equally hard at work when the media's eye was not on the Guard, building upon Kentucky's resources to assure we would play an integral role in national security well into the next century. I owe him much for his assistance in making sure the C-130H's, what I often call the thoroughbreds of military aviation, stayed in Kentucky. Our Air Guard's performance at the controls of those C-130H's in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda have brought them national recognition, and saved countless lives.

In addition, his development of the western Kentucky training site will make it a model of high-tech and all-terrain training for both Guard and active duty soldiers for years to come. Last year, 16,000 soldiers trained here. But, those numbers represent just the beginning in a long line of soldiers who will receive the best training this country has to offer. The skills they learn right in Kentucky will enable them to join the ranks of the best-trained military force in the world.

General DeZarn has also had a tremendous impact on the national level. The Department of Defense has been working to restructure the Nation's entire defense forces to better respond to the needs of the post-cold war era. General DeZarn has worked closely with his colleagues from other States to assure that the National Guard continues to play an integral and undiminished role in that new structure.

Mr. President, let me close by reiterating my thanks to General DeZarn for a job well done, and my appreciation for having had the honor to serve with him.

THE BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the Federal Government is running on borrowed time, not to mention borrowed money—nearly \$5 trillion of it. As of the close of business Friday, December 8, the Federal debt stood at \$4,988,945,631,994.24. On a per-capita basis, every man, woman, and child in America owes \$18,938.12 as his or her share of the Federal debt.

More than two centuries ago, the Constitutional Convention adopted the Declaration of Independence. It's time for Congress to adopt a Declaration of Financial Independence and meet an important obligation to the public that it has ignored for more than half a century—that is, to spend no more than it takes in—and thereby begin to pay off this massive debt.

CODEL STEVENS BOSNIA REPORT

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, last month the distinguished senior Senator from Alaska, Senator STEVENS, led a delegation of our colleagues—Senators INOUE, GLENN, BINGAMAN, HUTCHISON, SNOWE, and THOMAS—to Europe to carefully evaluate the plans for a possible NATO mission to the former Yugoslavia. The result of their travels

to Brussels, Sarajevo, and Zagreb are contained in a report, for which I ask unanimous consent to be printed in the RECORD.

This report addresses the four central questions of the Bosnian NATO mission—how soon, how many, how long, and how much. As for cost, officials admitted that it will mount to \$2.0 billion—not including the costs of the no-fly zone or enforcing the naval embargo in the Adriatic. With respect to how long, that remains a question that this Chamber will have to address as no one presented the codel with an effective exit strategy for NATO forces.

In closing, Mr. President, I would like to thank the Members and staff of codel Stevens. Their fine work on a timely and important report will help further illuminate our upcoming debate on Bosnia.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, November 27, 1995.

Hon. ROBERT DOLE,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
DEAR BOB: Last month, you authorized myself and Senators Hutchison, Snowe and Thomas to travel to NATO, Bosnia and Croatia to evaluate plans for a possible NATO mission to the former Yugoslavia.

The seven Senators who participated in this mission have prepared the attached report, which addresses the four central questions that you directed we study: how soon, how many, how long and how much.

We did not seek to reach any conclusions or specific recommendations to you or the Senate—our personal views reflected the wide range of positions held by our colleagues. We did seek to identify the many differing expectations and understandings that are held by the parties that will be involved in the peace settlement in Bosnia.

It is my request that the attached report be printed and made available to all Senators, to assist in their understanding and our upcoming debate and consideration of any resolution concerning U.S. participation in a Peace Implementation Force.

Cordially,

TED STEVENS.

CODEL REPORT INTRODUCTION

The Delegation was authorized by the Majority Leader and the Democratic Leader to travel to Europe, particularly Bosnia, to evaluate the current situation in the former Yugoslavia, the status of the peace negotiations, and potential plans by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States European Command (EUCOM) to engage in a military mission to implement a peace settlement. The Delegation was to assess these conditions, and report their findings to the Senate.

This report does not attempt to reach any conclusion about the outcome of the ongoing peace negotiations, which resumed this month at Wright-Patterson AFB. The Delegation did not seek to reach a consensus or make specific recommendations on the military plans under consideration at EUCOM and NATO Headquarters in Belgium. The Delegation hopes their mission will contribute to planned Senate hearings and subsequent consideration of any proposals for United States participation in any peace settlement in Bosnia.

The Delegation report consists of the following sections:

- (1) Listing of the Delegation
- (2) Listing of Delegation activities
- (3) Assessment of the situation in Bosnia
- (4) Expectations for a potential peace agreement
- (5) Plans/expectations for NATO peace implementation activities
- (6) Closing observations

LISTING OF THE DELEGATION

Senator Ted Stevens—Committee on Appropriations (Chairman).

Senator Dan Inouye—Committee on Appropriations (Co-Chairman).

Senator John Glenn—Committee on Armed Services.

Senator Jeff Bingaman—Committee on Armed Services.

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison—Committee on Armed Services.

Senator Olympia Snowe—Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senator Craig Thomas—Committee on Foreign Relations.

LISTING OF DELEGATION ACTIVITIES

U.S. European Command Headquarters

The Delegation met with the following senior U.S. military officials:

General George Joulwan; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Admiral Leighton Smith; Commander, Allied Forces South

General James Jamerson; Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command

General William Crouch; Commander, U.S. Army Europe

General Richard Hawley; Commander, U.S. Air Force Europe

Major General Edward Metz

Government of Croatia

The Delegation met with the Minister of Defense for Croatia, Gojko Susak.

United Nations officials

In Zagreb, Croatia, the Delegation met with the Senior Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and the Deputy Commander of U.N. forces in the former Yugoslavia, Canadian Major General Barry Ashton.

In Sarajevo, Bosnia, the Delegation met with the Commander of U.N. forces in Bosnia, United Kingdom Major General Rupert Smith.

Government of Bosnia

The Delegation met with the President of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic, the Vice President, Ejup Ganic and Prime Minister, Haris Sladjic.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters

The Delegation met with the following senior NATO leaders: Field Marshal Faye Vincent, Chairman of the Military Committee, Mr. Willy Claes, Secretary General of NATO, The North Atlantic Council—Ambassadors to NATO from: Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, Luxembourg, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, Iceland, Denmark, Greece, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada and the United States.

The Delegation also wishes to express its appreciation for the support and assistance of the United States Embassy to Croatia, the United States Embassy to Bosnia and the United States Mission to NATO. Ambassadors Galbraith, Menzies and Hunter all contributed significantly to the success of the mission, and their individual actions and leadership are no small part of the progress made so far towards a peace settlement in Bosnia.

ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN BOSNIA

At each venue, the strong statement to the Delegation was that the anticipated peace

negotiations in the United States offered the best likelihood of a serious cessation of hostilities. Without exception, leaders at NATO, in Croatia, in Bosnia and U.N. officials all cited the involvement of the United States as a catalyst for peace.

At the time of the Delegation's mission, the current cease fire agreement was only a few days old. While conditions in and around Sarajevo were significantly improved, according to Bosnian and U.N. officials, fighting continued elsewhere in Bosnia. While all parties hoped that the cease fire would take hold throughout the country, fighting in northwest Bosnia was especially active.

For nearly six months preceding the Delegation's visit, Sarajevo had been completely strangled. The airport had been closed to all traffic, and the only road access route crossed Mt. Igman. With the ceasefire, humanitarian conditions appeared to be improving. Local officials reported that utility services were being restored, and that food stocks in the city were higher. The Delegation observed large numbers of commercial trucks assembling in a convoy to exit the city. Despite these factors, the airlift of food supplies continued, to provide for the needs of local residents, and to maintain air access into the city.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Sarajevo, amid the destruction and devastation of incessant shelling and rocket attacks, was the utilization of the Olympic facilities as gravesites for thousands of Bosnians who have died during the fighting. Their graves serve as a poignant reminder that peace will be difficult to achieve, and that the personal loss of people on all sides of the conflict is severe.

EXPECTATIONS FOR A POTENTIAL PEACE AGREEMENT

The Delegation explored the expectations of two of the potential participants in a Balkan peace agreement during the mission. Key factors included the probable timetable for an agreement; the timetable for any implementation or peace enforcement mission; the objectives of any peace enforcement mission; the rules of engagement for any peace enforcement mission; and the criteria for the duration or conclusion of a peace enforcement mission. The following description summarizes the views encountered by the delegation during the mission.

Bosnian Government: Officials of the government of Bosnia made clear that any price agreement required the participation of the United States in the negotiation and implementation phases. From their point of view, the United States brought credibility to an agreement beyond the involvement of the United Nations or the European members of the Contact Group (the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Russia).

Very clearly, the Bosnian government anticipated that U.S. and NATO military units will serve to enforce the peace, and to protect both the internal and external borders determined in the peace settlement. Further, officials also cited the tremendous refugee and displaced persons dilemma facing Bosnia. One official also suggested the possible use of United States forces to reconcile the property claims of Bosnians displaced during the war.

The Bosnian government understood that U.S. and NATO forces engaged in a potential peace enforcement mission would be heavily armed, and would operate under robust rules of engagement. Bosnian government leaders anticipated a presence for such a force of at least 12 months, and from that point of view, up to 18 to 24 months.

Croatian Government: Officials of the government of Croatia made clear that the enforcement of a peace agreement would have

to rest outside of the U.N. framework currently in place. Their concept was for the potential U.S.-NATO mission to operate to separate the warring factions, acting as a buffer to achieve a stable military environment.

The Croatian government officials did not believe that the peace enforcement mission could be completed in twelve months. A key factor in the duration and success of the peace enforcement mission would be the extent to which the Bosnian government achieves an enhanced military capability. The Croatian defense Minister indicated that a peace settlement was likely to bring an end to the U.N. arms embargo, but that there was no need to arm the Bosnians after a peace plan is adopted. Croatia may not permit future weapons transfers through Croatia to Bosnia government forces following a negotiated peace settlement.

The Croatian government officials commented that Croatian national interests may or may not be fully addressed in the anticipated peace agreement. The status of the region of Eastern Slavonia will be a contention issue at the peace talks, and could precipitate further military action by Croatian forces.

United Nations: The Secretary General's Senior Representative made clear that a peace agreement will be difficult to maintain and enforce, based on the track record of all parties. Much credit was given to the renewed negotiations for achieving the present tentative cease fire, and the necessity of continued United States involvement in any future negotiations was emphasized.

U.N. officials stated that the current peace plans will require long-term peacekeeping activities to bring a period of stability to the region. They envision an on-going United Nations role, following the potential NATO-U.S. peace enforcement mission. The experience of the United Nations in the peacekeeping and reconstruction of Cambodia was cited as a possible model for participation in Bosnia.

NATO: Officials at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization headquarters in Brussels reflected primarily the understanding of United States officials about the prospective peace agreement. As NATO is not a direct participant in these talks, they indicated they would await insight from the U.S.-European Contact Group before finalizing any NATO position.

NATO representatives made clear their expectation that any peace agreement would hinge on an enforcement mechanism involving NATO and the United States. In the discussion with the North Atlantic Council, several Ambassadors made explicit their view that the United States must participate in the peace process, and that NATO involvement would be contingent on U.S. participation. The consensus of the NATO Ambassadors was that the United States was already involved and committed to the potential deployment of a NATO peace enforcement mission to Bosnia.

EXPECTATIONS FOR A NATO PEACE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE

Senior officers of the United States European Command, and component units, discussed in depth the planning underway for the training, organization and potential deployment of United States military forces as the largest single component of a NATO force. Many of the specific details were presented to the Delegation at the Secret or Top Secret classification level. The summary provided in this report does not reflect any classified information, but explains the approach and concerns presented to the delegation by these officials.

Significance of the Peace Agreement Details: All military officials made clear that

exact planning for any operation will hinge on the specific determinations of the anticipated peace agreement. Those factors include the location of U.S. forces deployed to Bosnia, the composition of any U.S. military force, the interaction of U.S. military forces with the United Nations or non-governmental reconstruction organizations, the conditions under which U.S. military forces deploy to Bosnia and the conditions and timing under which U.S. military forces would withdraw from Bosnia.

These uncertainties made difficult specific estimates on force size, mission cost and mission duration.

United Nations forces now deployed to the former Yugoslavia will constitute some portion of the NATO led peace implementation force. The attached chart details current deployments.

Once the peace enforcement mission begins, forces provided to UNPROFOR by NATO member nations will revert to NATO command and control, pursuant to NATO procedures. Military forces from other nations may remain as part of a complementary United Nations effort elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, or may be incorporated into the NATO force, accepting NATO command and operational management. This approach may come to resemble relationships established during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

All parties had differing specific expectations about the mission for the NATO peace implementation force. Those differing views highlighted the significant challenge facing the negotiations at upcoming peace talks in the United States.

Mission expectations fall in the following categories:

Implementation of Peace Agreement: NATO and U.S. officials anticipate that an agreement will detail the role for the peace implementation force. This could include geographic zones of responsibility and whatever functions are ultimately determined by the parties and the Contact Group.

Separation of Forces: In discussions with the Delegation, NATO officials indicated that the NATO force will provide a buffer between the armed forces of the Combatants. This concept would entail an occupation of specific areas, and a responsibility to police the military activities of the combatants.

Secure Borders. Some parties indicated that the NATO force would serve as a protection force, to maintain the territorial integrity of parties to the settlement reached in the peace negotiations.

Displaced Persons/Property: On a more complex level, there were suggestions to the delegation that the implementation force would play a role in assisting the return of displaced persons to areas determined by the peace settlement, and potentially enforce the return of property belonging to displaced persons.

U. S. EUCOM officials expressed concern about taking on any functions or responsibilities beyond their direct role as a peace implementation force—such as election monitoring, refugee resettlement or other initiatives related to nation-building.

COMPOSITION AND SIZE OF A NATO PEACE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE

The ultimate composition of the NATO peace implementation force will reflect the "proportionate contribution" of NATO members, according to officials in Brussels. Those nations with troops currently deployed will most likely sustain that presence. Other nations will nominate forces based on the plans developed by the Supreme Allied Command, reflecting the capabilities available in those national military forces. The attached chart reflects anticipated force levels.

The United States, France and the United Kingdom each anticipate providing roughly a division sized combat force. Each nation will tailor that force to reflect the specific geographic and ethnic characteristics of the region in which they will operate. Other nation's will contribute units ranging from company to battalion size, based on mission requirements.

For the United States, the call-up of approximately 1,500 to 2,000 reserve component personnel is likely. These units will participate primarily in combat support, service support, medical, civil affairs and military police functions. The reserve components have been heavily taxed over the past three years supporting U.N. and humanitarian relief missions in Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti and now Bosnia. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units are an essential element of the on-going airlift to support the Bosnian people.

COST ESTIMATES

Officials at the U.S. European Command were unable to provide any specific estimate on the cost of U.S. operations. Discussions with senior officials at the Department of Defense indicate that the likely incremental cost for fiscal year 1996 of the ground force component of a NATO peace implementation force will total approximately \$1.5 to \$2.0 billion. This amount does not address the costs of the on-going "no fly" enforcement mission or the naval embargo in the Adriatic Sea.

More detailed estimates are expected upon completion of the peace agreement, and the finalization of NATO operational plans.

TIMETABLE FOR POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT

Officials at the U.S. European Command estimated that NATO force would be tasked to deploy to Bosnia and Croatia within 96 hours of the formal adoption of a peace settlement. What will constitute the "formal adoption" of an agreement is not yet known. NATO leaders concurred with this estimate.

NATO leaders had not yet defined what mechanism would trigger the Alliance's participation in the mission, and the timetable for consideration by the North Atlantic Council of a request for NATO involvement. NATO officials anticipated that the military mission would be predicated on a United Nations Security Council resolution, authorizing such a mission pursuant to Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter.

NATO officials did not articulate the mechanism by which individual nations would determine and affirm their participation in the mission.

COMMAND AND CONTROL/RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Central to the role of U.S. military forces in a deployment to Bosnia will be the command relationships and the rules of engagement that would govern their participation. In every discussion, the Delegation found that all parties believed the utilization of NATO would obviate the problems encountered by the United Nations command structure. The flawed "dual-key" control by the United Nations of military force limited the usefulness of that force, and caused all the combatant parties to doubt and mistrust the commitment of the United Nations to securing peace in Bosnia.

U.S. military officials stated categorically that U.S. forces would serve under the command of U.S. military officers through the NATO chain of command. They affirmed that the rules of engagement will provide wide latitude to respond with disproportionate force to any attack or threat to U.S. or NATO personnel.

Less clear is how those rules of engagement will deal with threats to local populations, whether Bosnian Muslim, Croat or

Serb, by any military, guerilla or terrorist force. Again, the peace agreement is expected to provide guidance on the role of the military peace implementation force, and how they might respond to such situations.

PARTICIPATION OF NON-NATO FORCES

A point of sensitivity and uncertainty in discussions with U.S. military, NATO, Bosnian and Croat leaders was the participation of non-NATO military units in a peace implementation force. This applied both to the potential role for Islamic nations and Russia.

NATO leaders believed that the inclusion of Russian military forces would contribute to the stability and likely success of the mission. Officials in Croatia and Bosnia believe that the Serb parties will insist on a Russian presence. U.S. military officials stated that on-going discussions with the Russian military were addressing command, control and funding issues associated with any Russian participation. U.S. officials anticipated that each participant in the NATO-led peace enforcement mission would pay their own costs. Again, this issue is expected to be addressed in the anticipated peace settlement.

CLOSING OBSERVATIONS

While reaching no conclusion about what action the Senate might take regarding the potential deployment of U.S. military forces to Bosnia as part of a NATO peace implementation force, the Delegation believes that several critical and vital issues must be resolved before a full and complete understanding of the mission can be reached.

From the perspective of the use of U.S. military units, the following issues must be addressed:

- (1) The end state or "exit strategy" for U.S. forces.
 - (2) Funding for U.S. operational costs.
 - (3) Funding for non-NATO participants.
 - (4) Demarcation of U.S. and allied zones of deployment.
 - (5) Composition of U.S. and allied military forces.
 - (6) Logistics support for U.S. and allied military forces.
 - (7) Transit/air access in Bosnia.
 - (8) Air defense responsibilities.
 - (9) Transition for current U.N. mission to NATO control.
 - (10) Rules of engagement.
 - (11) Transition to civilian aid/recovery program.
 - (12) Specific tasks U.S. forces will perform.
- These outstanding issues are not intended to negatively reflect the discussions and meeting by the Delegation—they simply represent the unknown factors surrounding this mission.

FLAG DESECRATION CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 31, which the clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A joint resolution (S.J. Res. 31) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to grant Congress and States the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States.

The Senate resumed consideration of the joint resolution.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 12 minutes in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THOMAS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

PERCENTAGE DEPLETION ALLOCATION

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair. I will share with my colleagues a little known fact concerning the effect of the Clinton administration's new proposed 7-year balanced budget and the effect it will have for thousands of working men and women in Western States, those men and women working specifically in the mining industry.

This is a \$1 billion budget bombshell that will cost thousands of domestic jobs, and it will increase our domestic balance of payments, because buried in the details of the Clinton budget alternative is a provision that would hike taxes on many mining operations on Federal land.

The administration is proposing an elimination of the percentage depletion allowance for nonfuel minerals mined on public lands where mining rights were obtained by the patent process. "Patent process" can be construed to mean patents, as well as the process of applying for a patent.

This is extraordinarily far reaching, Mr. President. According to the administration, this would save—they use the word "save"—\$954 million over 10 years, placing a \$1 billion burden on our Nation's miners.

You can imagine the significance of trying to be competitive in a world market, suddenly faced with a reality of losing the depletion allowance, which in many cases allows our mining industry to be competitive internationally.

Why the White House has singled out the mining industry for punishment is anyone's guess. It appears to be the latest assault by Secretary Babbitt, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Clinton administration on the West.

The administration seems to want to paint the miners as some kind of corporate guru, the exception rather than the rule as far as the reality is concerned, because many of the operations are small mom-and-pop operations that are clearly in jeopardy by this proposal.

It would provide a war on hard-working people and their jobs. Why they are singled out as the only industry for termination, one can only speculate.

Oil, gas and coal jobs are not put in jeopardy by this move by the administration to lose the depletion allowance. However, one should reflect on the fact that this may be the camel's nose under the tent. It is only a matter of time until this administration will again use the Tax Code to go after oil and gas and the coal industry.

Having heard my friend from North Dakota express his concern over the deficit balance of payments, I again remind the President and my colleagues, this Nation grew strong on the development of our natural resources, our oil, our coal, our gas, our timbering industry, our mining industry, our grazing industry. All these appear to be put in jeopardy. In fact, the development of resources from all public lands appears to be on the administration's blacklist.